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23 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee
on Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 11:00 today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Comdr. David Knell	- Navy Department
Col. Clyde Rich	- Air Force
Col. William McNamee	- Army Department

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2. Mr. Block said that the State Department had not decided to accept the responsibility for putting the planning phases of psychological warfare with the NSC 4 Group. Contrary to what I had learned from Mr. Norberg, Mr. Block observed that no "high power meetings" had been held. He did mention that at the present time an examination was being made by the Department of State to check into what expansion and funds would be needed if the State Department accepted the planning responsibility. I observed that I did not see why any additional manpower or funds would be required if the NSC 4 Group took on this function. Mr. Block did not agree with this viewpoint and, in an obviously distraught frame of mind, said, "this is purely a State Department matter." I told him that everyone of us in the Subcommittee had a vital interest in this problem and that I thought it was unfortunate that by his attitude he had definitely "turned off the spigot." And thus ended the discussion on a very vital point.

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3. Colonel McNamee, referring to the fact that no answers had been received from the National Security Council on the recent proposals which were sent by the Subcommittee to the Council via SANACC, suggested that we should consider the possibility of formulating a recommendation that the Subcommittee "be dissolved because it has been ignored." Even though I smiled and nodded approval to Colonel McNamee, his suggestion fell like a lead balloon.

OSD & DOS review(s) completed.

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4. In the beginning of our discussion on emergency measures, Colonel Rich stated, "We're going to absorb the NSC 4 Group." Even though he said this in a rather flippant way, he was quite serious about the content of his statement. At this point, Commander Enell said, "General Wright wants this function to go over to NSC 4 and Navy will never agree to it, and you can tell him so." This statement, of course, was addressed to me.

5. Commander Enell said that the Navy recognizes that we of this Subcommittee have a charter to perform certain functions and the NSC 4 Group has no right to do these things which belong to us.

6. Mr. Block asked me for my viewpoints. I told him that I felt "very frustrated" about our current operations, and that it had been most disconcerting, especially during the last few meetings for us to be reaching up into thin air and pulling down ideas and subjects for discussion. Secondly, I told him that it was regrettable that we did not have strong backing and support for our endeavors.

7. Under the heading of "Emergency Measures", much discussion took place as to how this subject might be approached in view of the emergency type of organization which we had already recommended in our recent papers. This subject is again scheduled for deliberation at the next meeting.

8. Before concluding the meeting, the Subcommittee recommends that Mr. Block send a letter to SAMACC with the request that SAMACC ask the National Security Council for official information regarding what action, if any, has been taken on SSE 6, 12 and 14.

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[Redacted]

MEMBER, IGAPS

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